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On the 15th of May 2013, the Ankara Summit
Declaration was signed by the trade and economy
ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and
Turkey. It asserted the desire of all three states to
boost co-operation in areas such as trade, educational,
energy, and infrastructure. This agreement marked the
latest in a string of policy engagements made by the
Turkish government, under the leadership of the
Justice and Development party (AKP), and the area
considered to be both the Ottoman legacy and modern
Turkey’s ‘near-abroad’; the Western Balkans. Despite
The Economist’s assertion in 2011 that talk of an
Ottoman resurgence was unfounded – due to the
soft-power nature of Turkish activity which primarily
focused on monument restoration, soap-operas and
universities
 – the
list of economic sectors in which Turkey wishes to
invest continues to grow. As the signing of the Ankara
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declaration signifies, this desire to improve relations
between Turkey and South-Eastern European states
has been given a positive reception, with Serbian
Foreign Minister Ivan Mrkic enthusing that ‘the quality
of the political relations (between Serbia, Bosnia and
Turkey) is so high that it makes it possible for us to
operate on fourth markets together.’
.
The extent to which Turkey currently has the capacity
to become a significant economic player in an area
struggling to prosper in the wake of recent (and in the
case of Kosovo, still unresolved) conflicts, is a question
that has been widely discussed by analysts and
forecasters. It has been used to judge the potential
shape of the region economically. What has failed to
receive the same attention, however, is the manner
with which this surge of Turkish engagement in the
Western Balkans has been covered. The intense
Turkish westward turn has been accompanied by a
flurry of media attention repeatedly expressing
ethnically-framed fears that such activity creates in
areas still part of the vast Ottoman Empire just over a
century ago, and the power that collective memory has
to constrain modern foreign policy.
Rather than replicate economic and strategic analysis
of Turkey’s Balkan policy, this article questions the link
between civic memories of Ottoman rule, inter-ethnic
distrust, and a Turkish agenda of investment and
regional co-operation. It seeks to examine whether it is
possible to discuss the relationship between the
Ottoman past of the Balkans and modern Turkish
policy without subscribing to discourses of fixed
collective memory and narratives of ancient hatreds.
The Western Balkans is no stranger to being described
with an ‘ancient hatreds’ narrative. Rather, the region
had the dubious honour of becoming its poster-child
when former British Prime Minister John Major
infamously and simplistically attributed the collapse of
Yugoslavia to the concept. To him, the world had
witnessed a violent breakdown of inter-group relations
rooted in the memory of past atrocities and conflict.
Policy driven by an uncivilized and primitive nature is
also a narrative that has historically been utilised in
reference to Turks by European commentators.
Drawing from theories of identity construction
articulated by Levi-Strauss and Derrida, Yurdusev
argues that the depiction of Turks as ‘destructive
savages’ contributed to the self-affirmation of
Europeans as civilized and progressive. He states that
this is formed in contrast to their barbaric neighbours in
Turkey through negative representations, and that the
construction has lasted into the 21st century.
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 However, in
recent discussions of Turkey’s Balkan policies, it is
possible to identify a merging of both Balkanist and
Orientalist discourses, whereby modern Turkish foreign
policy can only be discussed alongside references to
the negative experiences of the region’s Ottoman past,
and the reactions of Western Balkan populations are
constrained by their inability to separate Turkish
investment from fears of colonial domination.
Arguably discussions of an Ottoman legacy are
appropriate. It would be revisionist to deny the
experiences of a collective Ottoman past, which ties
Turkey to the Balkans, as Ahmet Davutoglu, Turkey’s
Foreign Minister, has readily asserted.
 From the
architectural reminders of Ottoman-built mosques,
bridges, and markets, to an estimated one million
people with Turkish origins,
 the historical impact across the
region cannot be denied. What is evident, however, is
that the aspects of this past which are highlighted by
external commentators in reference to Ankara’s
contemporary engagement, are those that focus on the
darker aspects of the period. The vandalism of
Byzantine churches in Macedonia, harsh treatment of
Orthodox Serb populations, and widespread ‘fear’ from
groups which launched rebellions against the Ottoman
empire in the 19th and 20th centuries, are all examples
which have recently been employed by Western
journalists to suggest that a contemporary Turkish
presence in the Western Balkans is inevitably
problematic. It is implied that the modern,
predominantly secular, Turkish state can in no way be
separated from the violence of its colonial past.
Meanwhile, even the softest form of cultural influence
is discussed in colonial language, with popular Turkish
soap operas described as having ‘conquered’
audiences across the Balkans.
 There is a need for critical
engagement with these strongly asserted claims,
despite the fact that they are predominantly based
upon anecdotal evidence and primordialist ideas of
identity politics and ethnic mobilisation.
Although it seems absurd to need to qualify that an
increase in Turkish-run universities in the Western
Balkans will not lead to the stripping of icons from
Orthodox churches, the resilience as Turkey as the
primitive ‘other’ to a sophisticated Europe make it
necessary. Indeed these refutations have been
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publically stated by AKP members, eager to
emphasise the ‘Europeaness’ of their increased
investment in the Balkans. One example is President
Abdullah Gül reassurance to Balkan leaders at the
Southeast European Cooperation Process (SEECP)
meeting in 2010 that the values they wished to
promote and share with the region were ones of
European civilization.
 Keen to steer the conversation away
from the language of conquest and dominance, Turkish
politicians and analysts instead highlight the potential
impact of conflict resolution, and the country’s position
as an external mediator. Ankara’s recent peacemaker
track record is certainly tangible and widespread, with
mediations between Belgrade and Bosniak leaders in
Bosnia and Herzegovina resulting in the signing of the
Istanbul Declaration in April 2010. Diplomatic
intervention quelled intra-Bosniak factional
disagreements in the Sandz?ak region of Serbia; and
despite the potential friction of Turkey’s NATO
membership and recognition of Kosovo’s
independence, the former participated in the early
stages of negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina.
The readiness of Serbia to accept Turkey’s
involvement in the Kosovo issue clearly contradicts a
narrative of widespread Serb fears of
neo-Ottomanisation. Instead of cautiously mistrusting
the motives of a former colonial power, politicians in
Belgrade are welcoming Turkish participation on an
issue sensitive for the former Yugoslavia; the territorial
boundaries of what many believe to be the cradle of
the Serb nation. In fact, the only political leadership
which has openly resisted establishing a relationship
with Turkey, and therefore gives the most credence to
arguments of a collective inability to move beyond the
past, is the Republika Srpska entity of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. The entity’s Vice-President, Emil Vlajki,
has accused Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdogan of openly spreading Islamic influences
through the promotion of the interests of Muslim
populations in the Western Balkans. He asserts that
the government of the Muslim-Croat Federation is
complicit in this attempt, by establishing positive
relations with Turkey.
However, rather than demonstrating the strength of
resentment against Turkey as the former Ottoman
power, the protests of Republika Srpska can instead
be understood in a context of realpolitik manoeuvres
by an increasingly isolated nationalist entity. Following
the failure of internationally-implemented federalism to
create an integrated post-conflict Bosnia and
Herzegovina, the leadership of Republika Srpska is
reliant on whatever bargaining power it can leverage
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against the multi-ethnically structured Federation
government. Resistance to Turkish investment is an
attempt to further oppose the creation of an entity
within Bosnia over which they have minimal influence.
This limited influence is evident in the enthusiasm with
which the Federation leadership has welcomed Turkish
investment, particularly in the realms of culture and
education. Although the government of Republika
Srpska does represent the interests of over one million
Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, this pales in
comparison to the acceptance of ties between
Belgrade, Sarajevo, and Ankara by the majority of the
Serbian population. Dissenting voices are primarily
rooted in radical nationalist parties who would
traditionally be expected to oppose any regional
co-operation that did not assert Serb dominance,
regardless of the engagement with a former colonial
power. The refusal of Belgrade to support Republika
Srpska’s opposition to Turkey, especially under the
leadership of President Tomislav Nikolic, formerly a
Member of Parliament for the Serbian Radical Party
(SRS), further indicates the limits that the ethnic fears
narrative has in relation to the Western Balkan’s
Ottoman past.
In attempting to understand relationships between
Turkey and the Western Balkans, and more broadly
between the past and the present, it is certainly
prudent to treat a sudden resurgence of interest by any
former colonial power with caution and critical
exploration. However, the way in which current Turkish
foreign policy, and the reception that it has received by
Balkan populations, has been treated in journalistic
discourse is described, in the words of Maria Todorova,
as ‘hint[ing] at an analytical explanation of events in
the Balkans when real analysis seems too difficult or
too time consuming, or not worth embarking on.’
 Acknowledging
the strong ties Turkey holds to its former Ottoman
territories is important, but surmising that this history is
inherently negative and limiting is a false narrative
which continues to ‘other’ both Turkey and the Western
Balkans. The role of Turkey in promoting both its own
interests, and supporting peace and prosperity in the
Western Balkans, is still emerging. There is ample
opportunity for future media coverage to finally consign
the ‘ancient hatreds’ narrative to the past and instead
promote a discussion which truly reflects the
complexities of power and identity in south-eastern
Europe.
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